Lifting COVID-19 mitigation measures in Spain (May-June 2020).

Introduction: The state of alarm was declared in Spain due to the COVID-19 epidemic on March 14, 2020, and established population confinement measures. The objective is to describe the process of lifting these mitigation measures. Methods: The Plan for the Transition to a New Normality, approved on April 28, contained four sequential phases with progressive increase in socio-economic activities and population mobility. In parallel, a new strategy for early diagnosis, surveillance and control was implemented. A bilateral decision mechanism was established between the Spanish Government and the autonomous communities (AC), guided by a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators capturing the epidemiological situation and core capacities. The territorial units were established ad-hoc and could be from Basic Health Zones to entire AC. Results: The process run from May 4 to June 21, 2020. AC implemented plans for reinforcement of core capacities. Incidence decreased from a median (50% of territories) of 7.4 per 100,000 in 7 days at the beginning to 2.5 at the end. Median PCR testing increased from 53% to 89% of suspected cases and PCR total capacity from 4.5 to 9.8 per 1000 inhabitants weekly; positivity rate decreased from 3.5% to 1.8%. Median proportion of cases with traced contacts increased from 82% to 100%. Conclusion: Systematic data collection, analysis, and interterritorial dialogue allowed adequate process control. The epidemiological situation improved but, mostly, the process entailed a great reinforcement of core response capacities nation-wide, under common criteria. Maintaining and further reinforcing capacities remained crucial for responding to future waves.

Introducción: El 14 de marzo de 2020 España declaró el estado de alarma por la pandemia por COVID-19 incluyendo medidas de confinamiento. El objetivo es describir el proceso de desescalada de estas medidas. Métodos: Un plan de transición hacia una nueva normalidad, del 28 de abril, incluía 4 fases secuenciales incrementando progresivamente las actividades socioeconómicas y la movilidad. Concomitantemente, se implementó una nueva estrategia de diagnóstico precoz, vigilancia y control. Se estableció un mecanismo de decisión bilateral entre Gobierno central y comunidades autónomas (CCAA), guiado por un panel de indicadores cualitativos y cuantitativos de la situación epidemiológica y las capacidades básicas. Las unidades territoriales evaluadas comprendían desde zonas básicas de salud hasta CCAA. Resultados: El proceso se extendió del 4 de mayo al 21 de junio y se asoció a planes de refuerzo de las capacidades en las CCAA. La incidencia disminuyó de una mediana inicial de 7,4 por 100.000 en 7 días a 2,5 al final del proceso. La mediana de pruebas PCR aumentó del 53% al 89% de los casos sospechosos, y la capacidad total de 4,5 a 9,8 pruebas semanales por 1.000 habitantes; la positividad disminuyó del 3,5% al 1,8%. La mediana de casos con contactos trazados aumentó del 82% al 100%. Conclusión: La recogida y análisis sistemático de información y el diálogo interterritorial logaron un adecuado control del proceso. La situación epidemiológica mejoró, pero sobre todo, se aumentaron las capacidades, en todo el país y con criterios comunes, cuyo mantenimiento y refuerzo fue clave en olas sucesivas.

Lifting COVID-19 mitigation measures in Spain (May-June 2020).

INTRODUCTION: The state of alarm was declared in Spain due to the COVID-19 epidemic on March 14, 2020, and established population confinement measures. The objective is to describe the process of lifting these mitigation measures. METHODS: The Plan for the Transition to a New Normality, approved on April 28, contained four sequential phases with progressive increase in socio-economic activities and population mobility. In parallel, a new strategy for early diagnosis, surveillance and control was implemented. A bilateral decision mechanism was established between the Spanish Government and the autonomous communities (AC), guided by a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators capturing the epidemiological situation and core capacities. The territorial units were established ad-hoc and could be from Basic Health Zones to entire AC. RESULTS: The process run from May 4 to June 21, 2020. AC implemented plans for reinforcement of core capacities. Incidence decreased from a median (50% of territories) of 7.4 per 100,000 in 7 days at the beginning to 2.5 at the end. Median PCR testing increased from 53% to 89% of suspected cases and PCR total capacity from 4.5 to 9.8 per 1000 inhabitants weekly; positivity rate decreased from 3.5% to 1.8%. Median proportion of cases with traced contacts increased from 82% to 100%. CONCLUSION: Systematic data collection, analysis, and interterritorial dialogue allowed adequate process control. The epidemiological situation improved but, mostly, the process entailed a great reinforcement of core response capacities nation-wide, under common criteria. Maintaining and further reinforcing capacities remained crucial for responding to future waves.

[Lessons learnt from COVID-19 surveillance. Urgent need for a new public health surveillance. SESPAS Report 2022]. / Lecciones de la vigilancia de la COVID-19. Necesidad urgente de una nueva vigilancia en salud pública. Informe SESPAS 2022.

In this article we provide the most important epidemiological aspects in the first phases of the pandemic and some preliminary reflections from the Coordinating Centre for Health Alerts and Emergencies, the unit that has coordinated surveillance at the national level. COVID-19 has brought to light the weaknesses in the surveillance system and how difficult it is to manage a health crisis in the absence of a robust public health structure. The commitment of public health professionals during this epidemic has made up for the lack of resources in many occasions, and has evidenced the need to incorporate new professional profiles to surveillance teams. The need to rapidly adapt has achieved an improvement in existing systems and the development of new tools and new systems. These need to turn into structural changes that improve the quality of surveillance, decreasing territorial gaps and ensuring a better and coordinated response to future health crises. It is urgent to incorporate tools for process automation and to grant timely availability of data. To that end, public health and epidemiological surveillance must participate in the process of digital development within the National Health System. Profound changes are needed in public health surveillance, which has to be integrated in all healthcare levels. It is also important to strengthen the capacity for analysis by promoting alliances and joint actions. During this alert, the importance of coordination in public health in a decentralized country has been evident. At international level, it is necessary to review the tools to share data to coordinate an alert from the early stages.

Epidemiologic Features and Control Measures during Monkeypox Outbreak, Spain, June 2022.

During June 2022, Spain was one of the countries most affected worldwide by a multicountry monkeypox outbreak with chains of transmission without identified links to disease-endemic countries. We provide epidemiologic features of cases reported in Spain and the coordinated measures taken to respond to this outbreak.

Mpox (formerly monkeypox) in women: epidemiological features and clinical characteristics of mpox cases in Spain, April to November 2022.

Over 79,000 confirmed cases of mpox were notified worldwide between May and November 2022, most of them in men who have sex with men. Cases in women, for whom mpox might pose different risks, are rare, and Spain has reported more than one third of those in Europe. Using surveillance data, our study found similar time trends, but differences in delay of diagnosis, sexual transmission and signs and symptoms between men and women.

An imported case of vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2, Spain in the context of the ongoing polio Public Health Emergency of International Concern, September 2021.

The monthly retrospective search for unreported acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases conducted as a complementary component of the Spanish AFP surveillance system identified a case of AFP in a child admitted in Spain from Senegal during August 2021. Vaccine-derived poliovirus 2 was identified in the stool in September 2021. We present public health implications and response undertaken within the framework of the National Action Plan for Polio Eradication and the Public Health Emergency of International Concern.

[COVID-19 outbreaks in occupational settings in Spain, one year of follow-up (June 2020-June 2021).] / Brotes de COVID-19 en el ámbito laboral en España, un año de seguimiento (junio 2020-junio 2021).

COVID-19 outbreak surveillance in Spain was established with the main objective of characterizing outbreaks and the settings in which they occurred, in order to identify those population groups at highest risk to support them with the implementation of preventive and control measures. Between June 2020 and June 2021, 55,824 outbreaks were reported, with 414,882 cases in all settings. About 12.5% were reported in an occupational setting and within this, most of them were identified in the industry and building sectors. The outbreaks that had a greater impact were those that took place both in agriculture and in the meat industry, where there is a higher risk of exposure due to living and working conditions. Outbreaks in the catering and home care sectors were also frequent. Since the beginning, there was coordination between all stakeholders involved in the management of the pandemic, in order to implement prevention and control measures, as well as social protection measures. In addition, special actions were implemented in the most vulnerable sectors. Despite the work carried out, the presence of outbreaks in these sectors continues, although they are smaller than the previous pandemic phase. Due to this, there is needed to continue strengthening the inter-sectoral coordination structures and mechanisms to ensure the implementation of those measures that contribute to the containment of the pandemic.

La vigilancia de brotes COVID-19 en España se estableció con el objetivo de caracterizar los brotes y los ámbitos en los que ocurrían, con el propósito de identificar aquellos grupos de población con mayor riesgo para apoyar la toma de medidas de prevención y control. Entre junio de 2020 y junio de 2021 se comunicaron 55.824 brotes con 414.882 casos en todos los ámbitos. Alrededor del 12,5% de brotes y casos asociados fueron comunicados en el ámbito laboral y dentro de éste, la mayoría se identificó en los sectores de la industria y construcción, si bien, entre los brotes que han tenido un mayor impacto se encuentran aquellos producidos en el sector agrícola y en la industria de la carne, donde existe un mayor riesgo de exposición debido a las condiciones de vida y trabajo. También destacaron los brotes en el sector de la restauración y hostelería, y cuidados a domicilio. Desde el inicio hubo una coordinación entre las administraciones implicadas en la gestión de la pandemia para poner en marcha las medidas de prevención y control, así como las de protección social. Además, se llevaron a cabo medidas especiales en sectores de mayor vulnerabilidad. A pesar del trabajo realizado, los brotes en estos sectores continúan ocurriendo, si bien son de menor tamaño, por lo que se deben continuar fortaleciendo las estructuras y mecanismos de coordinación intersectoriales para la aplicación de las medidas que contribuyen además de la contención de la pandemia, a mantener activo el tejido productivo.

Unprecedented increase of West Nile virus neuroinvasive disease, Spain, summer 2020.

Cases of West Nile neuroinvasive disease (WNND) in Spain increased in summer 2020. Here we report on this increase and the local, regional and national public health measures taken in response. We analysed data from regional surveillance networks and the National Epidemiological Surveillance Network, both for human and animal West Nile virus (WNV) infection. During the 2020 season, a total of 77 human cases of WNV infection (median age 65 years; 60% males) were detected in the south-west of Spain; 72 (94%) of these cases developed WNND, presenting as meningoencephalitis, seven of which were fatal. In the previous two decades, only six human cases of WNND were detected in Spain. Reduced activities for vector control this season, together with other factors, might have contributed to the massive increase. Public health measures including vector control, campaigns to raise awareness among physicians and the general population, and interventions to ensure the safety of donations of blood products, organs, cells and tissues were effective to reduce transmission. Going forward, maintenance of vector control activities and an update of the vector-borne diseases response plan in Spain is needed.

A population-based controlled experiment assessing the epidemiological impact of digital contact tracing.

While Digital contact tracing (DCT) has been argued to be a valuable complement to manual tracing in the containment of COVID-19, no empirical evidence of its effectiveness is available to date. Here, we report the results of a 4-week population-based controlled experiment that took place in La Gomera (Canary Islands, Spain) between June and July 2020, where we assessed the epidemiological impact of the Spanish DCT app Radar Covid. After a substantial communication campaign, we estimate that at least 33% of the population adopted the technology and further showed relatively high adherence and compliance as well as a quick turnaround time. The app detects about 6.3 close-contacts per primary simulated infection, a significant percentage being contacts with strangers, although the spontaneous follow-up rate of these notified cases is low. Overall, these results provide experimental evidence of the potential usefulness of DCT during an epidemic outbreak in a real population.

El reto de la medición de la gravedad y la letalidad en el curso de la pandemia de COVID-19 / No disponible

No disponible

[Zika virus epidemic. The Public Health response in Spain]. / Epidemia por virus Zika. Respuesta desde la salud púbica en España.

By mid-2015, an increase in the number of cases of microcephaly among newborns and neurologic disorders was detected in the Northwest of Brazil, which was possibly associated with Zika virus infection. Later on, this phenomenon was also observed in several Latin-American countries. In February 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) on this basis, declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. From that moment on, several measures were adopted to achieve the epidemic control at both international and national levels. The WHO launched a strategic response plan based on case detection, infection control and treatment, as well as, the research and development of new vector control tools, diagnostic tests and vaccines. In Europe both surveillance and vector control systems were reinforced. The countries reporting most cases were France, Spain and the United Kingdom. In Spain, due to the high probability of case importation based on the close relationships with Latin-America, numerous measures were adopted to achieve a rapid response and an optimal control. Those included: the implementation of an active surveillance in collaboration with several experts, institutions and scientific societies; entomologic surveillance enhancement; the development of communication activities and recommendations for both healthcare workers and general population.

A mediados del 2015 se detectó en el noroeste de Brasil un incremento en el número de casos de microcefalia en recién nacidos y de alteraciones neurológicas, que se asociaron con una posible infección por el virus Zika y que más adelante comenzaría a observarse en otros países de Latinoamérica. En febrero de 2016 la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) declaró esta situación como una Emergencia de Salud Pública de Importancia Internacional (ESPII) y desde ese momento se llevaron a cabo numerosas medidas para el control de la epidemia tanto a nivel internacional, como nacional en los diferentes países. La OMS lanzó un Plan de respuesta estratégico basado en la detección de casos, control de la infección y tratamiento, así como en la investigación y desarrollo de herramientas para el control de mosquitos, test diagnósticos y vacunas. En Europa se reforzaron los sistemas de vigilancia así como de control de los vectores, siendo los países que más casos notificaron: Francia, España y el Reino Unido. En España debido a la alta probabilidad de importación de casos por la estrecha relación con Latinoamérica, se llevaron a cabo numerosas medidas que permitieron una rápida respuesta y un óptimo control, que incluyeron: la puesta en marcha de una vigilancia activa en la que colaboraron diversos profesionales, organismos y sociedades científicas; el refuerzo de actividades de vigilancia entomológica; el desarrollo de actividades de comunicación y la elaboración de recomendaciones dirigidas a profesionales sanitarios y a la población general.

Epidemia por virus Zika. Respuesta desde la salud púbica en España / Zika virus epidemic. The Public Health response in Spain

A mediados del 2015 se detectó en el noroeste de Brasil un incremento en el número de casos de microcefalia en recién nacidos y de alteraciones neurológicas, que se asociaron con una posible infección por el virus Zika y que más adelante comenzaría a observarse en otros países de Latinoamérica. En febrero de 2016 la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) declaró esta situación como una Emergencia de Salud Pública de Importancia Internacional (ESPII) y desde ese momento se llevaron a cabo numerosas medidas para el control de la epidemia tanto a nivel internacional, como nacional en los diferentes países. La OMS lanzó un Plan de respuesta estratégico basado en la detección de casos, control de la infección y tratamiento, así como en la investigación y desarrollo de herramientas para el control de mosquitos, test diagnósticos y vacunas. En Europa se reforzaron los sistemas de vigilancia así como de control de los vectores, siendo los países que más casos notificaron: Francia, España y el Reino Unido. En España debido a la alta probabilidad de importación de casos por la estrecha relación con Latinoamérica, se llevaron a cabo numerosas medidas que permitieron una rápida respuesta y un óptimo control, que incluyeron: la puesta en marcha de una vigilancia activa en la que colaboraron diversos profesionales, organismos y sociedades científicas; el refuerzo de actividades de vigilancia entomológica; el desarrollo de actividades de comunicación y la elaboración de recomendaciones dirigidas a profesionales sanitarios y a la población general

By mid-2015, an increase in the number of cases of microcephaly among newborns and neurologic disorders was detected in the Northwest of Brazil, which was possibly associated with Zika virus infection. Later on, this phenomenon was also observed in several Latin-American countries. In February 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) on this basis, declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. From that moment on, several measures were adopted to achieve the epidemic control at both international and national levels. The WHO launched a strategic response plan based on case detection, infection control and treatment, as well as, the research and development of new vector control tools, diagnostic tests and vaccines. In Europe both surveillance and vector control systems were reinforced. The countries reporting most cases were France, Spain and the United Kingdom. In Spain, due to the high probability of case importation based on the close relationships with Latin-America, numerous measures were adopted to achieve a rapid response and an optimal control. Those included: the implementation of an active surveillance in collaboration with several experts, institutions and scientific societies; entomologic surveillance enhancement; the development of communication activities and recommendations for both healthcare workers and general population

[Possible introduction and autochthonous transmission of dengue virus in Spain]. / Posibilidad de introducción y circulación del virus del Dengue en España.

Dengue has become a major public health problem worldwide. Ae. albopictus, vector responsible for transmission, was first detected in Catalonia in 2004. Since then, it has established along Mediterranean coast. The aim of this paper is to describe the risk of importation and possible autochthonous transmission of dengue virus in Spain, qualitatively reviewing factors that could influence the emergence of dengue in our country, and the implications for public health. No autochthonous transmission has occurred in our country to date, but infected travelers coming from endemic countries are arriving to Spain constantly. The transmission of this disease could occur on the Mediterranean coast. Transmission would be more likely in the warmer months due to cultural habits and higher vector densities. While most of the population would be susceptible, given the characteristics of the disease, the impact on health's population would be low. The main public health strategy to reduce the risk of importation and possible dengue transmission should focus on primary prevention, to prevent interaction of the virus, vector and human. These three components must be addressed in a comprehensive and multisectoral plan of action, intensifying some activities in the areas of greatest risk. Coordination of public health from all sectors involved is essential for the proper functioning of this integrated response plan for vector-borne diseases.

Posibilidad de introducción y circulación del virus del Dengue en España / Possible introduction and autochthonous transmission of Dengue virus in Spain

El dengue se ha convertido en un importante problema de salud pública mundial. Ae. albopictus, vector competente para su transmisión, se detectó por primera vez en Cataluña en 2004. Desde entonces se ha establecido por la costa Mediterránea. El objetivo del artículo es describir el riesgo de importación y posible transmisión del dengue en España, revisando cualitativamente los factores que podrían influir en su emergencia en nuestro país, así como las implicaciones que tendría a nivel de salud pública. Aunque el virus no circula actualmente en España, constantemente llegan personas infectadas procedentes de países endémicos. La transmisión de esta enfermedad podría ocurrir en la costa mediterránea. Sería más probable en los meses más cálidos por los hábitos socioculturales y las mayor presencia del vector.Aunque la mayoría de la población es susceptible, el impacto en la salud de la población sería bajo dadas las características de la enfermedad. La estrategia fundamental de salud pública para reducir el riesgo de importación y posible transmisión del dengue debe enfocarse a la prevención primaria para evitar la interacción del virus, el vector y los seres humanos. Estos tres componentes deben abordarse dentro de un plan de acción integral y multisectorial, intensificando algunas actividades en las zonas de mayor riesgo. La coordinación desde salud pública de todos los sectores implicados es imprescindible para el correcto funcionamiento de este plan integral de respuesta ante enfermedades transmitidas por vectores (AU)

Dengue has become a major public health problem worldwide. Ae. albopictus, vector responsible for transmission, was first detected in Catalonia in 2004. Since then, it has established along Mediterranean coast. The aim of this paper is to describe the risk of importation and possible autochthonous transmission of dengue virus in Spain, qualitatively reviewing factors that could influence the emergence of dengue in our country, and the implications for public health. No autochthonous transmission has occurred in our country to date, but infected travelers coming from endemic countries are arriving to Spain constantly. The transmission of this disease could occur on the Mediterranean coast. Transmission would be more likely in the warmer months due to cultural habits and higher vector densities. While most of the population would be susceptible, given the characteristics of the disease, the impact on health’s population would be low. The main public health strategy to reduce the risk of importation and possible dengue transmission should focus on primary prevention, to prevent interaction of the virus, vector and human. These three components must be addressed in a comprehensive and multisectoral plan of action, intensifying some activities in the areas of greatest risk. Coordination of public health from all sectors involved is essential for the proper functioning of this integrated response plan for vector-borne diseases (AU)

Dispersion of Aedes albopictus in the Spanish Mediterranean Area.

Emergence and re-emergence of arboviral disease in new areas of southern Europe is becoming a public health problem. Since Aedes albopictus was first detected in 2004 in Catalonia, it has spread along the Spanish Mediterranean coast. Results of an entomological surveillance carried out by the Spanish Ministry of Health to monitor the expansion of Ae. albopictus along the Spanish Mediterranean coast between 2009 and 2012 are presented. Besides the new locations in Valencia and Murcia regional communities, it was identified in five municipalities in the Balearic Islands in 2012. A comprehensive plan aiming the control of invasive vector-borne diseases including entomological surveillance should be considered.

Situación epidemiológica y de los factores de riesgo de transmisión de Leishmania Infantum en España / Review of the current situation and the risk factors of Leishmania Infantum in Spain

En España la leishmaniasis es una zoonosis endémica presente en la mayor parte del territorio peninsular e Islas Baleares. El parásito que se detecta es la Leishmania infantum y el principal reservorio es el perro. Los vectores competentes para transmitir el parásito son los flebotomos, de los que existen dos especies distribuidas por todo el territorio peninsular e Islas Baleares. En este artículo se revisa la situación actual y el comportamiento de la leishmaniasis en España. Se analiza y compara la información sobre la enfermedad procedente de las altas hospitalarias y de la Red Nacional de Vigilancia Epidemiológica así como los factores de riesgo identificados en estudios anteriores que facilitan la transmisión. Desde 2009 está teniendo lugar un brote en el suroeste de la Comunidad de Madrid, destacando el elevado número de casos, cerca de 400 y la detección de un nuevo reservorio, la liebre. Las condiciones que pueden incrementar la incidencia de la leishmaniasis están asociadas al aumento del número de vectores infectados, al de la densidad del flebotomo, al de hospedadores o la aparición de nuevos reservorios en un área geográfica. Esta infección tiene una dinámica de transmisión compleja y para responder oportunamente a los brotes debe estar previamente desarrollado un plan de acción integral y multisectorial en el que participen todas las instituciones involucradas. Ante un brote, es importante estudiar los factores que condicionan la transmisión del lugar y adaptar el plan de acción a sus características específicas(AU)

In Spain, leishmaniasis is an endemic zoonosis present in most of the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands. The parasite detected is Leishmania infantum and the main reservoir is the dog. Competent vectors to transmit the parasite are sandflies, of which there are two species distributed throughout the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands. This article reviews the current situation and the behaviour of leishmaniasis in Spain. It analyzes and compares information about the disease from hospital discharges and from the National Epidemiological Surveillance Network. It also analyses the risk factors that facilitate transmission identified in previous studies. Since 2009 an outbreak is occurring in the southwest part of the Community of Madrid, with a significant number of cases, about 400 and the detection of a new reservoir, the hare. The conditions that can increase the incidence of leishmaniasis are linked to the increase number of infected vectors, increase sandfly density, increase hosts or the appearance of new reservoirs in a geographic area. This infection has got a complex transmission dynamic. To timely respond to outbreaks a comprehensive and multisectoral action plan should be developed joined by all the institutions involved in the preparation and response. Before an outbreak occurs, it is important to study all the factors affecting the transmission in that place and to adapt the action plan to the specific characteristics(AU)

[Review of the current situation and the risk factors of Leishmania infantum in Spain]. / Situación epidemiológica y de los factores de riesgo de transmisión de Leishmania infantum en España.

In Spain, leishmaniasis is an endemic zoonosis present in most of the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands. The parasite detected is Leishmania infantum and the main reservoir is the dog. Competent vectors to transmit the parasite are sandflies, of which there are two species distributed throughout the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands. This article reviews the current situation and the behaviour of leishmaniasis in Spain. It analyzes and compares information about the disease from hospital discharges and from the National Epidemiological Surveillance Network. It also analyses the risk factors that facilitate transmission identified in previous studies. Since 2009 an outbreak is occurring in the southwest part of the Community of Madrid, with a significant number of cases, about 400 and the detection of a new reservoir, the hare. The conditions that can increase the incidence of leishmaniasis are linked to the increase number of infected vectors, increase sandfly density, increase hosts or the appearance of new reservoirs in a geographic area. This infection has got a complex transmission dynamic. To timely respond to outbreaks a comprehensive and multisectoral action plan should be developed joined by all the institutions involved in the preparation and response. Before an outbreak occurs, it is important to study all the factors affecting the transmission in that place and to adapt the action plan to the specific characteristics.

Epidemiología de la varicela en España en los períodos pre y post vacunación / Epidemiology of varicella in Spain pre-and post-vaccination periods

Fundamento: El virus varicela zoster puede causar dosenfermedades, la varicela y el herpes zóster. La vacuna frentea la varicela se incorporó en España en 2005 para personassusceptibles de entre 10 y 14 años. En 2007 se aprobó una propuestade vigilancia de la varicela y herpes zóster que permitieradetectar posibles cambios en los patrones de distribuciónpor edad, en la gravedad y complicaciones. El objetivo de estetrabajo es conocer la carga de enfermedad por varicela antes ydespués de la vacunación.Método: Se analizan los datos agregados (casos e incidencia)de varicela y herpes zóster en España en el sistema CMBDpara 1997-2003 y 2005-2007, así como la mortalidad por estaenfermedad a nivel nacional para e período1999-2006.Resultados: El 88,1% de los casos de varicela se da enpersonas menores de 15 años. En el CMBD se registró un promedioanual de 1.311 ingresos. No se observaron cambios significativosen la distribución por edad, sexo ni complicacionesdurante los ingresos en ninguno de los períodos estudiados. El32-36% anual ingresó por un motivo diferente a varicela. Lamortalidad osciló entre 4 y 14 individuos/año, el 80% mayoresde 14 años. El 64% de los casos notificados de herpes zósterfueron mayores de 50 años. La tasa media anual de ingresospor fue de 2,5 por 100.000 habitantes sin diferencias por sexo.La tasa media anual de defunciones fue 0,31 por millón dehabitantes.Conclusiones: En España la varicela tuvo una disminucióngeneralizada durante 2005-2007, pero es difícil valorar elimpacto de la vacunación por la falta de cifras de coberturavacunal y porque este período coincide con el inmediato a laúltima onda epidémica, cuyo máximo se registró en 2004(AU)

Background. Varicella virus can cause two differentdiseases: chickenpox and herpes zoster. In 2005 varicellavaccine has been introduced in the Spanish nationalvaccination schedule for 10-14 years old non-immune people,in order to reduce the severity of the disease. In 2007 a newsurveillance protocol with aggregate data for chickenpox andherpes zoster was approved in order to detect any change inage distribution, severity and complications of the chickenpoxand herpes zoster cases. The aim of this study is to know theburden of diseases (in the last ten years).Methods. Number of cases, hospitalization and incidencefor chickenpox and herpes zoster were study for two periods1997-2003 and 2005-2007. Analysis for 1996-2007 fatal caseswas done too. We decided to remove year 2004 because theextremely high chickenpox incidence registered. Sources ofdata: RENAVE (Spanish Surveillance Network), Spanishhospital surveillance system (CMBD), and mortality registries.Results. Chickenpox incidence decreased since 2005, butan increasing trend was detected in hospitalisation with anaverage of 1,311 hospitalizations every year. For the 32%-36%of hospitalized cases, the main diagnosis was not chickenpox.4-14 deaths per year have been detected; 80% of them wereolder than 14 years. Annual rate of herpes zosterhospitalization was 2.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, similar in bothsexes. Case fatality rate per year was 0.31 per millioninhabitants. No significant changes were detected in age andsex in complicated cases between the two periods. 88% ofchickenpox cases were younger than 15 years old and 64% ofherpes zoster older than 50 years in 2007.Conclusions. Chickenpox has been decreasing during2005-2007 in Spain...(AU)

[Epidemiology of varicella in spain pre-and post-vaccination periods]. / Epidemiología de la varicela en España en los períodos pre y post vacunación.

BACKGROUND: Varicella virus can cause two different diseases: chickenpox and herpes zoster. In 2005 varicella vaccine has been introduced in the Spanish national vaccination schedule for 10-14 years old non-immune people, in order to reduce the severity of the disease. In 2007 a new surveillance protocol with aggregate data for chickenpox and herpes zoster was approved in order to detect any change in age distribution, severity and complications of the chickenpox and herpes zoster cases. The aim of this study is to know the burden of diseases (in the last ten years). METHODS: Number of cases, hospitalization and incidence for chickenpox and herpes zoster were study for two periods 1997-2003 and 2005-2007. Analysis for 1996-2007 fatal cases was done too. We decided to remove year 2004 because the extremely high chickenpox incidence registered. SOURCES OF DATA: RENAVE (Spanish Surveillance Network), Spanish hospital surveillance system (CMBD), and mortality registries. RESULTS: Chickenpox incidence decreased since 2005, but an increasing trend was detected in hospitalisation with an average of 1,311 hospitalizations every year. For the 32%-36% of hospitalized cases, the main diagnosis was not chickenpox. 4-14 deaths per year have been detected; 80% of them were older than 14 years. Annual rate of herpes zoster hospitalization was 2.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, similar in both sexes. Case fatality rate per year was 0.31 per million inhabitants. No significant changes were detected in age and sex in complicated cases between the two periods. 88% of chickenpox cases were younger than 15 years old and 64% of herpes zoster older than 50 years in 2007. CONCLUSIONS: Chickenpox has been decreasing during 2005-2007 in Spain. The impact of vaccination is difficult to asses, because of a peak registered in 2004 but also because the lack of vaccination coverage information for this period and the case-data information is available only for the last year.

Mortalidad por accidentes en Cuba: estudio de 15 años; 1970-1984 / Mortality due to accidents in Cuba: a 15 year study 1970-1984

Se analiza la mortalidad por accidentes en un período de 15 años (1970 a 1984) en nuestro país. Se distribuyeron los casos por sexo, grupos de edad y tipo de accidente. Los datos iniciales se procesaron y se obtuvieron las tasas y distribuciones porcentuales, la tendencia para los diferentes tipos de accidentes y los años potenciales de vida perdidos por estos. Se encontró que el sexo masculino fue 2 veces y media más afectado por todos los tipos de accidentes, excepto en los causados por fuego que es 1,4 veces más frecuente en las mujeres y las caídas accidentales, que son también ligeramente más frecuentes en éstas; el riesgo a morir por un accidente es mayor en las personas de 70 años y más; los accidentes qye ocasionaron mayor número de víctimas fueron los accidentes del tránsito (44% del total) y las caídas accidentales (19%). La mayor cantidad de años de vida perdidos en las 5 primeras causas de muerte corresponde a los accidentes (34%)